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Terrorism	Review
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27 January 1986

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	This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor	2

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	Terrorism Review	25 X
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Focus	Western Europe—Targets for Abu Nidal Retaliation?	25X
	The recent attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports demonstrate that the Abu Nidal Group remains one of the most active—and ruthless—international terrorist organizations. We know of at least 23 incidents staged by the group in 1985; the	
	toll was 34 dead and 327 wounded. Thirty-four of the casualties were US citizens (excluding those Americans wounded when Egyptian authorities stormed the	
	hijacked Egyptair plane in Malta). Given this record of violence, another Abu	
	Nidal attack appears to be virtually inevitable. The questions are: Where? When?	25X
		25/
	We judge that West European countries currently holding Abu Nidal Group	
	members are at particular risk of attack (see foldout table). The Abu Nidal Group has been known to stage retaliatory attacks against those countries that have	
	imprisoned its members. In fact, the Abu Nidal political spokesman announced on	
	8 January 1986 that, "some of our people are imprisoned in Europe. We are going to liberate them before long; that we can guarantee." At present, eight countries	
	are holding a total of 22 Abu Nidal members.	25X
	The committee along the season of Dukish Association and the Committee of Committee	
	The group has already attacked British targets in attempts to force the release of its members. Under the name Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims	
	(ROSM), it has conducted eight bombings and assassinations against British	
	targets since March 1984. London has not been intimidated, however, and the	25X
	group members remain in custody.	23/
	Abu Nidal has also threatened retaliatory attacks against other West European	
	countries.	25X
	A person	25X ∠5∧
	purporting to be Abu Nidal also threatened French interests in an interview in the	051
	West German magazine Der Spiegel in mid-October.	25X 25X
		23/
	In addition to these pressure tactics, the Abu Nidal Group has also attempted to	
	strike deals with several West European governments.	25X
		25X


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Outlook We expect that Abu Nidal will stage further attacks in Western Europe; it not only has a motive to do so, but also it can apparently operate there with ease. We consider the following countries most likely targets or venues for attacks:	
• The United Kingdom continues to hold five of the group's members.	
• Italy and Greece will continue to be favorite staging areas, despite stepped-up security in those countries.	
• Austria will be targeted as long as the government refuses to accede to Abu Nidal's demands for clemency for jailed members there.	
• Malta is also a possible target;	25X1 25X1
Less likely though still possible as targets for Abu Nidal are:	
• Portugal and France, where group members are due to be released shortly.	
• Spain, which has a substantial Abu Nidal presence, was not the site of any attacks between 1980 and mid-1985.	25 X 1
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Abu Nidal N Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/15 : CIA-RDP87T00685R000200310002-2

Country	Name	Date of Incident	Sentence (in years)	Remarks
Austria—5	Banij Muhammad Yunis Hisham Rajah Marwan Hasan	29 August 1981	20 Life Life	Jailed for the Vienna synagogue at- tack. Yunis's 20-year sentence was upheld in October 1985.
	Ali Mufleh Abu al-Higah Mahmud Khalil Abdullah Abd al-Gawad	27 December 1985		Arrested for the attack against the El Al counter at Vienna's Schwechat airport.
United Kingdom—5	Husayn Ghassan Sa'id Marwan al-Banna Nawaf Nagib Mislih Rusan	3 June 1982	30 30 35	Jailed for the attempted assassination of Israeli Ambassador Argov.
	Rasmi Abd al-Hafiz Awad Nasir Karim Muhammad	22 September 1985		Arrested for conspiring to cause explosions.
Italy—4	Husayn al-Nawajah	3 April 1985		Arrested for firing a light antitank weapon at the Jordanian Embassy.
	Ahmed Husayn Abu Sereya	16 September 1985		Arrested for the attack against the Cafe de Paris in Rome.
	Hasan Itab	25 September 1985		Arrested for the bombing of the British Air office. A Greek witness says that Itab is the same individual responsible for a grenade attack against an Alia office in Athens on 21 March 1985. The Greeks are not now considering extradition.
	Muhammad Abdullah Sarham	27 December 1985		Arrested for the attack against the El Al counter at Rome's Fiumicino airport.
France—2	Abd al-Qadr Hatim Assad Kayd	3 August 1978	10 10	Jailed for the assassination of PLO representative Izz al-Dinn al-Qalaq. Both likely to be paroled in February 1986.
Greece—2	Abd al-Usama al-Zumar	22 November 1982		Arrested in possession of explosives. Italy has requested his extradition in connection with an attack on a Rome synagogue on 9 October 1982, but the extradition process is dragging.
	Samir Hamit Salamah	30 August 1985		Arrested planning attack against the Jordanian Ambassador.
Spain—2	Sa'id Ali Salman and an accomplice	3 March 1980	24	Jailed for the assassination of Spanish attorney Adolfo Cotelo Villareal.
Malta—1	Muhammad Ali Abd al-Rizq	23 November 1985	-	Arrested for participation in Egyptair hijacking (group affiliation still unknown).
Portugal—1	Yusif al-Awad	10 April 1983	3	Arrested for the assassination of PLO official Sartawi. In May 1985, a jury found Awad innocent of the murder. The judge, however, reconfirmed Awad's conviction for using a false passport and upheld his three-year sentence. Since Awad had already seved 25 months, his lawyer has argued for



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Highlights

Significant Developments

Belgium

Possible CCC Attack To Free Leaders?

Four key members of the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC)—including Pierre Carette, its alleged leader—were arrested on 16 December. Police speculate that the CCC nevertheless remains capable of staging a major attack—perhaps a kidnaping designed to pressure the government to release its imprisoned comrades. The most likely target would be a Belgian political official, although US or NATO personnel could be targeted.

Colombia

Conflict Over RFF Massacre

The former leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces' (FARC) dissident group, the Ricardo Franco Front (RFF), Javier Delgado, reportedly has taken "credit" for the murder of more than 100 persons. The bodies were found in several mass graves in Cauca Department in December. The victims had been strangled or knifed; many, including children and pregnant women, had been tortured and mutilated. The massacre was described as an attempt to purge presumed infiltrators from the security forces, although Colombia's Defense Minister has denied that any armed forces personnel were among the victims.

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The impact of the massacre on the 450-member Ricardo Franco Front could be devastating. The 19th of April Movement (M-19) has been closely linked to the RFF since last September, when the RFF joined a national guerrilla alliance led by the M-19. That link may now have been broken. The M-19 has condemned Delgado for ordering the killings and has called for the RFF's expulsion from the national guerrilla coordination group. The RFF reportedly has relieved Delgado of command and plans to try him for "arbitrary detentions, torture, and homicide." The group's rejection by the umbrella group is likely to weaken it still further.

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Ecuador

Second-Ranking Leader of AVC Killed by Police

Fausto Basantes Borja, considered to be the second in command of the terrorist group Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC), was killed in a 4 January shootout with police. Basantes died while resisting arrest on a street near Quito's international airport. Police found one revolver on his body, and another revolver and a grenade in his briefcase, which bore the legend "Etco-Medi-Cuba," the name of a Cuban importexport house dealing in medical supplies.

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The death of Basantes resulted from a well-planned and -coordinated operation that began in mid-December after the abortive kidnaping of a wealthy Ecuadorean businessman

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	death probably will, for the time being, create a climate of uncertainty within the AVC And it will provide a needed boost to the morale of the police forces, who failed to rescue the kidnaped businessman.	25X 25X 25X
South Africa	ANC Strategy Change in Civilian Casualties? The civilian toll from recent bombings in Durban and landmine incidents along	
	South Africa's border with Zimbabwe and Botswana suggest that the African	
	National Congress (ANC) is less reluctant to hit nonmilitary targets in South Africa. Recent statements by ANC Acting President Oliver Tambo appear to confirm this. Tambo stated recently that the Durban bombing in December was	
	not officially sanctioned by the ANC, suggesting that ANC local units may have	
	acted unilaterally.	25 X 1

Libya's Increasing Ties to Radical Palestinians		25 X 1
The 27 December attacks on the El Al ticket counters in the Rome and Vienna airports have focused attention on the degree of Libyan involvement in these acts of terrorism. Even more significantly, they may be one more signal of increasing ties between Libya and radical Palestinian terrorist organizations like the Abu Nidal Group. Mu'ammar Qadhafi began supporting more radical Palestinians in the mid-1970s after deciding that Yasir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization were becoming too moderate. Since then, Libya sporadically has provided funding, arms, training, and safehaven to most of the radical factions of the Palestinian movement, notably the Abu Nidal Group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC), the Fatah dissidents, Saiqa, the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). Evidence acquired over the last year suggests Libya is again increasing aid to these groups and now provides logistic support to terrorist operations. Qadhafi probably would see great profit in linking his regime more directly to these militants and their activities. They share common enemies—Israel and ts supporters and moderate Arab and Palestinian eaders—as well as a ruthless approach to pursuing their struggle. These groups are rich in manpower and have extensive operational networks in Western Europe. Their successful attacks on two continents have garnered tremendous international attention. By soining forces with them operationally, Qadhafi could probably trade increased financial and logistic support for a role in their target selection, and use of their	the PFLP appear to be searching for alternative or supplementary backing to that provided by Syria, their longtime patron. They may feel that Damascus has become heavyhanded in its support and tries to exert undue control over them, or that Syria now views the Palestinian cause as less important than its own goals in Lebanon. They may also hope to gain use of Libyan diplomatic facilities to help stage their attacks. Financial Support Libya is more willing—or perhaps able—than Syria to provide funds to radical Palestinian groups. Qadhafi has not kept all his promises of money, however.	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
Dersonnel and West European support apparatus for Libyan operations. The radical Palestinians would have their own reasons for more active cooperation with Libya and, in at least one case, have in fact proposed joint planning for	The radical Palestinians' search for alternatives to Syrian hospitality to avoid the strings that Damascus attaches—such as tight supervision of in-country activity—has led several groups to consider other	25X1

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terrorist operations. Groups such as Abu Nidal and

countries as possible bases for their operations. At least two of these radical groups give signs of moving their operations to Libya, which also may make corollary benefits apart from safehaven—such as passports and similar documentation—available to them. Abu Nidal reportedly is living in Tripoli and has moved part of his organization there, although he		25X1
still maintains offices in Syria. George Habbash, leader of the PFLP, reportedly also has moved to Libya, leaving only three members of his Political	several instances of joint planning for terrorism, initiated by both Libya and	25 X 1
Bureau in Damascus.	the Palestinians:	25 X 1
Military Aid and Training Libya has given military training to Palestinian	• An unspecified joint operation in Tunisia reportedly was being planned in early December by Libyans and members of Abu Nidal	25X1
groups off and on for more than 15 years. Current training of Palestinians now occurs both inside and outside Libya. It is also well established that Libya	and members of Abu Ividat	25X1 25X1
provides weapons to several Palestinian groups.	 Libya tasked Fatah dissidents and the PFLP-GC to kill Libyan dissidents at a training camp in Lebanon. We do not know, however, if any attacks occurred. 	25X1
	• Early in 1985, a high-ranking member of the Abu Nidal Group requested the names of Libyans imprisoned in Britain. They apparently offered to demand the release of those prisoners in exchange for Britons they claimed to have recently kidnaped. Abu Nidal commonly threatens to attack countries holding its members unless their colleagues are freed.	25X1
	There is also a body of more circumstantial evidence indicating Libyan involvement in specific terrorist events conducted by radical Palestinians. For example, Libya clandestinely disseminated copies of	20.1
Intelligence and Terrorist Cooperation Most alarming is the increasing Libyan-Palestinian cooperation in intelligence gathering and terrorist operations. The Palestinian groups that now appear to have such operational ties to Qadhafi are Abu Nidal,	the communique issued in the name of the hijackers of Egyptair Flight 648 in November 1985. Although Libya may not have been involved in the actual hijacking, at a minimum Tripoli tried to exploit the incident. In addition, Libya provided passports	
the PFLP-GC, and the Fatah dissidents. all of these parties favor cooperation in terrorist activity, and there is some evidence indicating that such cooperation is emerging.	Abu Nidal, which later were used by the terrorists responsible for the recent December attack on the El Al ticket counter at the Vienna airport. Tripoli clearly	25X1 ₍₁ 25X1
	was aware that Abu Nidal would use the passports in the conduct of terrorist activity.	25X1 25X1

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Outlook

Right now, Tripoli and the Palestinians are probably assessing each other's capabilities and intentions carefully, with an eye to determining whether even closer ties are warranted. Nonetheless, greater cooperation may have some limits. Each of the Palestinian groups, particularly Abu Nidal, has its own agenda and values its autonomy. Consequently, we expect none of these groups would be willing to become totally dependent on Libyan support. Moreover, in many respects, Syria is a natural ally and should continue to play a key role. Nevertheless, to the extent that links between Libya and the Palestinian radicals increase—a process that now appears to be under way—the range and effectiveness of each partner's terrorist operations will also increase.

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Spain: The Threat From Middle Eastern Terrorists	
Since 1984 Middle Eastern terrorist activity in Spain has been growing. While the indigenous terrorist threat posed by the Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization (ETA) will remain a challenge for Spanish security officials in the near term, we expect that violence emanating from the Middle East will pose an increasing threat to US interests there.	Middle Eastern - Origin Terrorist Incidents in Western Europe, 1981-85
Changing Pattern Most Middle Eastern terrorist activity in Western Europe has been directed against other Middle Eastern targets, and Spain was no exception. Not only is the tempo of this violence increasing but also its targets now include some non-Middle Easterners as well:	70 60 50
In February 1985, a Jewish-owned travel agency was bombed, injuring five persons. Spanish authorities believe the perpetrators were Arabs. The bombing of the El Descanso Restaurant near Torrejon Air Force Base in April was probably committed by a radical Palestinian group. The attack left 18 Spaniards dead and 15 Americans among the 82 persons injured.	10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
On 1 July, a grenade attack damaged the offices of British Airways and TWA in Madrid. A radical Shia group, the "Organization of the Oppressed," claimed responsibility for the attack.	307966 1-86
• Almost simultaneously, a second grenade attack occurred at the Madrid offices of Alia, the Jordanian national airline. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM) and Black September—both believed to be covernames	

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for the Abu Nidal Group—claimed credit for this

¹ In this incident, as well as a number of others, the culprits remain unknown. The choice of targets, however, is strikingly different than that characterizing the <u>Basque</u> terrorist groups that have

attack.

plagued Spain for decades.

 On 16 October, suspected Middle Eastern terrorists launched an arson attack against the Iranian Embassy compound, seriously damaging the building. In December, Spanish officials ordered the expulsion of three Libyans, including two diplomats, suspected of plotting an assassination attack in Madrid on Dr. Muhammad Magaryaf, the head of a major Libyan opposition group who was scheduled to visit Spain. Why Spain? The growing spillover of violence from the Middle East into Spain is part of a general trend affecting Western Europe as a whole. Middle Eastern terrorists operating in Europe have ready access to an existing and extensive support network, can secure greater publicity, and, in some cases, can better conceal their links to a state sponsor or parent organization. Apart from this, however, Spain now provides some special advantages as well as incentives: 	Spain's announcement on 17 January that it is officially recognizing Israel will make Spanish officials and facilities appropriate targets for Arab wrath. Spain currently holds several Arab terrorists in prison. Supporters could carry out attacks in an effort to secure their comrades' release. The bombing of the British Airways and TWA offices in July, for example, occurred only a week after two Shias were sentenced by a Spanish court to 23 years in prison. Those Responsible circumstantial evidence link terrorist activity in Spain to Libya. support to a variety of foreign terrorist groups in Spain is not a recent phenomenon, and Spanish authorities have been maintaining close surveillance of the Libyan People's Bureau after finding evidence that Tripoli has been financing and assisting the ETA. Libya has designated its People's Bureau in Madrid as a focal point for terrorist planning in Spain and throughout Western Europe.	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
Historically, Spain has strong cultural ties to the Middle East together with a sizable number—an estimated 40,000 to 70,000—of resident Arabs and Iranians. New faces from the Middle East blend easily into this milieu and have little trouble making contact with countrymen who share their religious and political orientations The US presence in Spain is large and high profile. the El Descanso Restaurant was selected as a target primarily because large numbers of US military personnel frequented it.	According to press reports, the expelled Libyans all had connections to the Abu Nidal Group. The Libyan Office of Special Services, also known as the Office of Revolutionary Affairs, reportedly also maintains clandestine contacts with various foreign groups, including Palestinian terrorist groups.	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

Recent developments suggest that Iranian-sponsored		25X1
terrorists are also becoming more active in Spain.	1	25X1
radical Shias, in part as a reaction to the tightened security at Western facilities in the Middle East, are trying to develop an independent operating capability in Western Europe. Notably, in 1984, Iranian-sponsored terrorists staged at least 10 actual or planned attacks in Western Europe, and four of these either occurred in Spain or had a Spanish connection: On 18 May, two Iranian-trained operatives traveling to Madrid were arrested at a Rome airport while carrying explosives. On 23 July, four Iranians were arrested in Madrid for allegedly plotting to hijack a Saudi airliner. On 31 July, a Kuwaiti businessman was shot and wounded in Spain; an anonymous caller claimed	In the past year the Abu Nidal Group, which rejects any political solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, has accelerated its attacks throughout Western Europe without sustaining any serious damage to its operational capabilities. The group has threatened further attacks against West European and US interests, and the imprisonment of Abu Nidal members in Spain makes that country a likely venue for operations intended to secure their release. Links to Indigenous Terrorists The ETA's primary goal remains Basque independence, and its military wing, ETA-M, has characteristically targeted Spanish police and military	25X1 25X1 25X1
Islamic Jihad was responsible.	personnel—not US personnel or facilities. The group	25 X 1
• On 14 September, a Saudi tourist was killed in	has long claimed to be in contact with the principal	23/1
Spain, and an anonymous caller claimed Islamic	terrorist groups in the world;	25 X 1
Jihad was responsible.		25 X 1
Though no Iranian-sponsored attacks occurred in Spain in 1985, the Iranian Government continued efforts to develop operational capabilities there. In October 1985, Tehran opened an unofficial office in Barcelona similar to one that Spanish police closed in July 1984 after arresting the staff for planning to	Apart from intermittent financial support, since the mid-1970s, ETA members have been trained at Algeria's National Police Academy, allegedly with funds provided by Libya. Some ETA militants reportedly have fought with the Western Saharan	25X1 25X1
hijack a Saudi airliner and for illegal possession of arms and explosives. The new office, like its predecessor, does not have official status.	Polisario Front; in 1980, others were rumored to have received guerrilla training at a Fatah-run Palestinian camp in Lebanon. In 1980, arrested Basque terrorists, including four ETA members, admitted receiving paramilitary training in South Yemen. In 1984, five others reportedly received training in Libya. The ETA has also received offers of help from the PFLP, but we do not know whether concrete aid was forthcoming. Despite the government's successes against Basque terrorism over the last two years, the ETA could decide to enhance its capabilities by forging stronger ties to Middle Eastern groups. It remains a	25X1 25X1
Palestinian groups also pose a strong potential threat in Spain. in late 1984 that Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were highly organized in Spain and	sophisticated terrorist organization, and closer cooperation with groups hostile to US interests would appreciably increase the threat to Americans in Spain.	25X1 25X1
potentially very dangerous. the		25X1
PFLP now has 1,000 to 2,000 members and		
supporters in Spain, divided into numerous small cells		0EV4
following rigid security measures.		25X1

Outlook
For Spain, the El Descanso bombing may have
signaled the end of what had long been considered a
special Spanish immunity to Middle Eastern
terrorism. If,
a radical Palestinian terrorist group
was responsible, the attack could be a harbinger of
heightened risk to US interests in Spain. The evidence
is not clear, however, and some observers still suspect
the indigenous First of October Antifascist Resistance
Group (GRAPO), long known for its anti-
Americanism.
Spain's formal recognition of Israel causes Spanish
officials to fear that their embassies and diplomats in
the Middle East will become targets for Arab
extremists. Improvements in security will take several
months.
Spanish authorities are keenly aware of the terrorist
threat to Spanish security and have promulgated a
new immigration law that will allow closer vigilance
of the Middle Eastern population in Spain.

Colombia:	Nicaraguan	Links
	sts' Weapons	

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Our analysis of weapons used by members of the 19th of April Movement (M-19) during their November siege of the Colombian Palace of Justice indicates that nearly half of the recovered arms were fully automatic military assault rifles—some of which can be linked to Nicaragua. Other recovered weapons included improvised explosive devices, commercial US civilian firearms, and grenades and other ordnance captured or stolen from military or police units.

We do not know if Managua supplied the assault rifles directly to the M-19, but their discovery represents the first confirmed evidence that Nicaraguan arms are reaching insurgents in Colombia. The presence of military weapons from Nicaragua may presage increased M-19 access to a variety of ordnance that would enhance the group's ability to conduct a broad range of terrorist operations.

On 7 November 1985 Colombian military and police units stormed the Palace of Justice in Bogota, which had been taken over the previous day by armed members of the M-19. Colombian forces killed more than 40 insurgents and captured large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and other ordnance as they retook the Palace in fierce floor-by-floor fighting. Although many of the captured weapons were badly burned, we were able to examine and identify most of the recovered firearms. Some of these weapons were commercial firearms of a type previously identified as being in the M-19 arsenal. Nearly half of the recovered weapons, however, were more powerful military assault rifles—some of which could be traced to Nicaragua.

Military Weapons

M-19 insurgents used a mixture of military and civilian weapons during their takeover of the Palace of Justice. Out of the 31 captured M-19 firearms that we were able to examine, nearly two-thirds were of military origin:

- Six US 5.56-mm Colt M-16 assault rifles.
- Five Belgian 7.62-mm FAL assault rifles.
- Three Israeli 7.62-mm Galil assault rifles.



Captured assault rifles included US M-16s, Belgian FALs, and Israeli Galils (top to bottom).

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- One West German 7.62-mm G3 assault rifle.
- One US .30-caliber Underwood M-1 carbine.
- One US .45-caliber M-3 submachinegun.
- One Israeli 9-mm Uzi submachinegun.
- One "Madson" 9-mm submachinegun of unknown (possibly Brazilian) manufacture.

Of the weapons listed above, we had insufficient information to determine where the terrorists acquired five types of weapons that are or have been used by a variety of Latin and Central American police and military forces and could easily have been obtained locally by the M-19.

We were able to make some judgments about the past history of the 14 remaining assault rifles—of US, Belgian, and Israeli origin. We can definitively link at least two of each type of weapon to Nicaragua:

 Traces run on the serial numbers of two of the US M-16s indicate that the weapons were sold to the government of former Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza in 1976.

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
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
US M-16 assault rifles sold to Nicaragua in

• Two of the Belgian FAL assault rifles bear Venezuelan national crests and have serial numbers corresponding to FALs provided to the Sandinistas in 1979.



Other recovered items of military ordnance may also be linked to Nicaragua, but we cannot make a definitive determination either because of the condition of the weapons or because of the unavailability of records:

• Of the four remaining M-16 assault rifles, one appears identical to those traceable to Nicaragua. Its serial number has been effaced, however, and running traces is impossible. The three remaining M-16s all bear US property stamps, indicating that they were issued to US military units rather than sold to foreign governments. Traces run on their serial numbers indicate that one was sent to Vietnam in 1968 and the others were sent to overseas shipping areas in 1968 and 1972. According to the Weapons Registry at Rock Island Arsenal, they probably also were shipped to US forces in Vietnam. Large quantities of similar



Belgian FAL assault rifle with Venezuelan national crest and serial number. Weapon was provided to the Sandinistas in 1979 by previous government in Caracas.

Vietnam-war-vintage US M-16 assault rifles have been captured since the early 1980s in the possession of Nicaraguan-backed guerrillas.

- Of the three remaining Belgian FALs, two were sanitized by having their national crests milled off. Similar sanitized FALs—with drilled out, rather than milled, crests—have been recovered from Nicaraguan-backed rebels in El Salvador. In both cases, the obliterated areas correspond in size and location to the Cuban national crest, which the manufacturer, Fabrique Nationale of Belgium, stamped onto FALs produced under Cuban contract. Moreover, both of the sanitized FALs recovered at the Palace bear hidden date production codes that indicate they were made in 1958 and 1959; that is, at the same time that Fabrique Nationale was fulfilling the Cuban contract.
- About 100 rounds of 7.62-mm by 51-mm Blocorigin ammunition were discovered. Headstamp markings indicate that this ammunition was manufactured in 1967 in Factory Number 10 in Kazanluk, Bulgaria. Similar Bulgarian ammunition—also made in Factory 10 during the 1960s—was discovered in rebel possession in El Salvador in 1984.

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Israeli Galil assault rifle with property mark of former Nicaraguan basic infantry school, EEBI.

• Although most of the explosive ordnance appeared to have been either homemade or stolen from the military, two detonators for Chinese PG-2 high-explosive, rocket-propelled grenades were recovered in the Palace. Although no RPG-2 launchers or PG-2 grenades were found, this is the first time any RPG-2—related equipment has been discovered in the M-19's possession. As with the Vietnam-war-era US M-16s and the Bulgarian ammunition, however, large quantities of Chinese RPG-2s have been captured from leftist guerrillas in Central America.


Commercial Firearms

The remaining third of the captured weapons consists almost entirely of civilian firearms, which—with one exception—were either manufactured in or imported into the United States. These include:

- Three US .38-caliber Smith & Wesson revolvers.
- One US .38-caliber Colt revolver.
- One US .45-caliber MAC 10 submachinegun.
- One US 16-gauge Winchester shotgun.
- One US .30-caliber Universal M-1 carbine.
- Two Israeli 9-mm Uzi semiautomatic carbines made specifically for export to the United States.
- One Spanish 7.65-mm Star pistol.
- Two US 5.56-mm Colt AR-15 semiautomatic carbines.

In addition to these arms, other confiscated commercial items of US origin included 9 Willson AR 700 gas masks and 2 Daco Safety Products, Inc.,

"Chemlite" flashlights that shoot tear gas.



ent to Vietnam in 1968. 25X1 25X1

The presence of large quantities of commercially available US firearms and equipment among the weapons found at the Palace confirms our previous assessment that such small arms are readily available to a variety of terrorist insurgent and criminal groups in Colombia. An analysis completed earlier this year of other weapons recently captured by Colombian authorities from drug traffickers, the M-19, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) indicated that most of the weapons recovered from each group were relatively new, commercially available firearms that were either manufactured or purchased in the United States. Typically, these arms are large-caliber, large-magazine-capacity, paramilitary-style weapons such as semiautomatic Uzi and M-1 carbines and semi- and fully automatic MAC 10 submachineguns. Although some evidence suggests that US weapons reach Colombia via Mexico, we believe that most of the captured US firearms were purchased in Florida—probably by drug traffickers. Traces run on their serial numbers indicated that almost all had been sold by Miami gunshops-often to persons of Latin or Central American origin. Similar US commercial paramilitary weapons have recently begun turning up in Jamaica and other Caribbean nations in association

with the illicit drug trade.

25X1 25X1

25X1

25X1

17




Belgian FAL assault rifle with milled-out national crest. Similar sanitized FALs from Cuba have been discovered in the possession of leftist rebels in El Salvador.



In addition to small arms, Colombian forces recovered a wide variety of other ordnance from the Palace of Justice. As with past M-19 caches, most of the recovered material consisted of commercial explosives, homemade bomb components, and military items probably captured or stolen locally. This ordnance included:

- Six 1-kilogram packages of commercial explosives.
- Ten improvised claymore mines.
- 75 commercial blasting caps.
- Six homemade electronic timers with antitamper devices.
- Five small sticks of US and Costa Rican industrial explosives.
- Two US M-72 light antitank weapon (LAW) launch tubes (probably captured from Colombian forces).
- Two rifle grenades (one of which was captured from Colombian forces).
- One unidentified handgrenade (with Spanish instructions).
- Two unidentified smoke or thermite grenades (with no markings).
- 3,598 rounds of military 5.56-mm ammunition (of Brazilian, Mexican, and—predominantly—US manufacture).
- 200 rounds of Colombian 7.62-mm by 51-mm ammunition.
- 99 rounds of Bulgarian 7.62-mm by 51-mm ammunition.
- 100 rounds of Colombian 9-mm by 19-mm ammunition.
- 67 rounds of commercial US .45-caliber ammunition.



Typical Cuban Army contract FAL.

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Implications

Because of the limited number of weapons found in the Palace of Justice, any conclusions based on this one incident about how the M-19 acquires its weapons must be provisional. Specifically, we do not know the exact route the M-19 followed to get these firearms. Nor do we know whether they acquired them directly from Managua or bought them second or third hand from gray market dealers in arms transit areas such as Panama, where M-19 members regularly purchase weapons.

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At a minimum, the surviving weapons help confirm earlier indications that the M-19 and other Colombian insurgent groups are able to obtain a wide variety of commercial US firearms in quantity. The apparent availability of such weapons makes it easier for groups like the M-19 to resupply their arsenals through gray market channels should the availability of military weapons be significantly reduced.

25X1

Perhaps more significantly, the recovered weapons also provide the first confirmed evidence that small arms from Nicaragua are reaching the M-19. Although we can definitively link only a small share of the captured firearms to Nicaragua, these weapons are among the most lethal firearms recovered from the Palace. In contrast to the captured US commercial weapons, most of which fire handgun cartridges, the Nicaraguan arms—as well as the other assault rifles that may also be linked to Nicaragua—are all fully automatic military weapons and shoot

25X1

more powerful rifle ammunition. Although we do not know if Managua supplied these weapons directly to the M-19, the fact that at least two of each of three different types of assault rifles can be linked to Nicaragua suggests that, as a group, these arms did not pass through many intermediaries before reaching the M-19. If several intermediaries had been involved, we would have expected less homogeneity regarding the types and origins of the weapons.	In contrast, direct or indirect provision by the Sandinistas of military explosives and other ordnance to the M-19 could lead to a qualitative increase in the group's operational capabilities in the area. If the M-19 is receiving arms from Nicaragua, we would expect to see Soviet-style handgrenades, explosives, and mines turning up in future arms caches instead of the large percentage of improvised explosive devices that was found in the Palace. Bloc military ordnance would be far more destructive than the improvised	25X1
If Managua has begun channeling arms to the M-19,	devices, which contain less powerful commercial	
we would expect to see the gradual introduction of	explosives.	25X1
different—but not necessarily more powerful— ordnance into the group's arsenals in the near future.		25X1
Specifically, this would probably include quantities of older, surplus Bloc equipment like Kalashnikov assault rifles, Czechoslovak submachineguns, and RPG-2 antitank weapons—all of which Managua has provided to leftist rebels in El Salvador and Honduras. ² Possession of these weapons would not, however, result in a qualitative increase in the M-19's capabilities, since the group already has access to limited quantities of similar Western assault rifles, US M-79 grenade launchers, and M-72 LAWs. Large infusions of such weapons would, however, greatly enhance the group's ability to conduct operations		20/1
similar to the Palace siege and to rearm itself should		
such operations prove equally costly in terms of lost materiel.		25X1
materier.	1	
		25X1

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Chronology of Terrorism—1985 and 1986

	Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.	25X1
1 December	Philippines: New People's Army kills two businessmen during occupation of market in southern Mindanao. The guerrillas also handed out leaslets describing the victims as bandits.	25X1
3 December	Israel: Bomb explodes in crowded commercial center in Afula. No casualties were reported, and no group claimed responsibility.	25X1
	Lebanon: Israelis raid terrorist base 16 kilometers north of Hasbaya. Several persons were reportedly killed, and the raiders were said to have captured four members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command during the three-hour battle.	25X1
5 December	Israel: Small bomb explodes in Hazikron Garden in Haifa near entrance to Interior Ministry. There were no casualties, and no group claimed responsibility.	25X1
8 December	Lebanon: Israeli troops capture members of Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine in southern security zone. The terrorists reportedly were carrying weapons, explosives, and large amounts of food.	25X1
	Israel: Two members of Jewish terrorist group pardoned. The men had been convicted of planning to blow up the dome of the Rock Mosque, a Muslim shrine in East Jerusalem, in 1984.	25X1
9 December	Israel: Two Israeli kidnap victims killed in DFLP shootout with IDF troops in northern Israel. A firefight reportedly broke out when terrorists of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine were stopped at a roadblock. Three of them reportedly were wounded in the exchange and arrested.	25X1
10 December	Chile: Seven FPMR terrorists bomb Santiago subway. Passengers were ordered off the train before the bomb exploded, damaging the cars and rails and paralyzing the morning rush hour. As they fled, the terrorists opened fire with submachineguns, seriously wounding two policemen on guard outside the station. A spokesman for the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front later claimed the attack	
	was to mark the group's second anniversary on 14 December.	25 X 1

13 December	Turkey: Bombs explode outside Italian Consulate and Banco di Roma in Istanbul. Turkish authorities believe that members of Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left) were responsible. The bombings may have been to protest a West German extradition request to the Italian Government for the former Dev Sol leader, Pasa Guven, who was arrested in Italy on 14 October.	25X1
	Cyprus: Three terrorists sentenced to life imprisonment for murders of Israelis. The defendants—two Palestinians and a Briton—were convicted of murdering three Israelis at the Larnaca yacht club on 25 September. That incident is believed to have led to the Israeli decision to bomb PLO headquarters in Tunis on 1 October.	25X1
14 December	Chile: Car bomb explodes in front of military school in Santiago. Minor damage resulted, and there were no casualties. No claims of responsibility have been made for the attack.	25X1
15 December	Austria: Bomb explodes at Jewish cultural community apartment building in Vienna. The explosion caused no injuries, but the building and seven vehicles parked adjacent to it were damaged. Police suspect local anti-Semitic groups.	25X1
17 December	Cyprus: Police thwart possible plans to hijack Swiss Air flight from Larnaca to Amman. A Palestinian holding a Jordanian passport was arrested with weapons, handgrenades, and a silencer in his possession. Police are looking for three other Arab suspects.	25 X 1
	Ecuador: Two banks robbed in Guayas, netting over \$100,000. Police suspect the terrorist group Alfaro Vive, Carajo!.	25 X 1
	Chile: Movement of the Revolutionary Left attacks offices of electric company in Valparaiso, wounding two guards. The attack caused a blackout for several hours in a large area of the central coast.	25 X 1
	Zambia: Letter bomb discovered in Lusaka's main post office. The device had been postmarked in Lobatse, Botswana, and was addressed to the Congress of South African Trade Unions.	25 X 1
18 December	India: Sikh separatists suspected of killing Hindu teacher in Punjab. The shooting from a motorcycle is similar to several other recent assassinations by Sikhs.	25X1
19 December	Northern Ireland: Mortar attack at Castleberg police station injures six persons, including one policeman. The Provisional IRA is probably responsible for the attack.	25X1

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	West Germany: Arson attack on defense contractor's offices in Wetter-Wengern causes \$4 million in damage. The Brueggemann Company makes parachutes and airfreight containers for the West German armed forces and maintains business contacts with South Africa. Authorities believe the Revolutionary Cells was responsible.	25X1
20 December	South Africa: Bomb discovered in Durban municipal offices. Two local government officials and 500 city employees were in the building. No group has claimed credit for the incident.	25X1
21 December	France: Four masked gunmen bomb tourist office in Biarritz, kidnaping five employees. The captives were released unharmed 3 kilometers away. Leaflets signed by the French Basque separatist group Iparretarak were left at the scene.	25X1
	Namibia: South-West Africa People's Organization terrorists kill tribal headman's son. The victim was in his father's shop in northern Namibia at the time of the attack.	25 X 1
	South Africa: Grenade destroys family van in Durban, injuring six, including two children. No group has claimed responsibility, but the African National Congress is suspected.	25 X 1
21-22 December	Northern Ireland: Two mortar attacks on police stations in Carrickmore and Strabane cause only minor damage. There were no injuries.	25 X 1
22 December	Corsica: Two explosions seriously damage banks in Ajaccio. Leaflets signed by the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica were found at the scene.	25X1
	Portugal: Two-kilogram bomb explodes at Iberia Airlines ticket office in Lisbon. There were no injuries reported. The Autonomous Revolutionary Group claimed responsibility for the blast.	25X1
23 December	Spain: Retired civil guard general assassinated in Pamplona. In a Christmas Day communique, the Basque group Fatherland and Liberty-Military Wing claimed credit, stating that the murder was to avenge the death of imprisoned Basque terrorist Mikel Zabalza.	25 X 1
	Turkey: Iranian dissident assassinated. Hadi Aziz Murdani, a former colonel in the Iranian Army and the representative of the Iranian National Resistance Movement in Turkey, was gunned down by three unidentified men.	25X1

	Israel: Police safely detonate bombs in two separate incidents. One of the devices was placed in a bus station in Kefar Sava and the other at the entrance to a supermarket in Petah Tiqvah. The Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claimed both attacks in a PLO radiobroadcast.	25 X 1
	Gaza: Fire destroys 100 buses at Erez junction. Security officials arrested a suspect the next day. In a PLO radiobroadcast, the Palestinian Revolution Forces claimed responsibility for the attack.	25X1
	Iran: Flight security guards foil hijack attempt of domestic flight. One would-be hijacker was reported killed. This attempt was the second such in Iran in less than a month.	25X1
	Peru: Sendero Luminoso celebrates Mao Zedong's birthday with wave of bomb attacks throughout Peru. The group set off at least 51 bombs against such targets as the Ministry of Transportation, 10 Peruvian banks, offices of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), a monument to APRA founder Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, a police station, a Coca-Cola Company warehouse, various commercial buildings, and electrical towers. Most of the attacks occurred during	23/1
	South Africa: Homes of prominent civil rights attorney and leading Muslim figure firebombed. There are currently no suspects in the early morning attacks.	25X1
	South Africa: Seven killed, 46 injured in Durban shopping center bombing. The	25 X 1
	African National Congress is believed responsible. India: One killed, six injured in bombing of crowded Chandirgarh marketplace.	25X1
	Sikh separatists are suspected. India: Home of Sri Lankan Tamil guerrilla official bombed in Madras. The	25X1
	spokesman of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam escaped injury in the blast, which he claimed was carried out by the Sri Lankan Government.	25 X 1
	Sri Lanka: Iranian diplomats escape injury in shooting near Iraqi Embassy. Police have charged that the attack was carried out by two Iraqi Embassy employees; the Embassy has denied complicity.	25 X 1
24 December	Sweden: Former Kurdish Labor Party terrorist stabbed in Stockholm assassination attempt. The victim has charged that the rival Kurdish Social Democratic Party was responsible for the attack.	25X1
	Peru: Sendero Luminoso guerrillas assassinate Chilacayoc village mayor. The victim was stabbed and shot to death in the main plaza in front of the townspeople. The guerrillas also set fire to the townhall and educational center and called upon the people to join the armed struggle.	25 X 1

	Pakistan: Mine explodes in Kacchagari refugee camp, killing one Afghan refugee and injuring four others. No group has claimed responsibility.	25X1
	Philippines: Sugarcane planter murdered in Negros Occidental Province. The Communist insurgent New People's Army claimed responsibility for the killing in a subsequent letter.	25X1
	Philippines: New People's Army "sparrow unit" assassinates Army colonel in Angeles City. The victim was the chief of the Inspector General's Office at Camp Olivas and was killed while attending a wedding.	25X1
25 December	Israel: Explosion at power station in Hadera kills one, injures four. The Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claimed responsibility for the attack, although Israeli radio has attributed the explosion to a faulty boiler.	25X1
	Peru: Sendero Luminoso kidnaps, tortures, and kills mayor-elect of San Pedro Hualla. The victim's body was found on 29 December.	25 X 1
	South Africa: Large arms cache discovered near Lamontville. Police say automatic weapons, mines, handgrenades, explosives, and guerrilla literature were included.	25X1
Late December	Spain: Three Libyans, including two diplomats, expelled. They were suspected of plotting terrorist attacks against a Libyan exile leader in Madrid.	25 X 1
26 December	Spain: Court convicts two Basque politicians for "apologizing for terrorism." The conviction was based on statements they made to Spanish journalists in December 1983, justifying a Basque political party's refusal to condemn ETA killings of police and military personnel on the grounds that the police and military represent an occupation force in the Basque provinces.	25 X 1
	Lebanon: Shia Muslim group executes one of four Lebanese Jews kidnaped last March. A letter signed by the "Organization of the Oppressed" stated the execution was in retaliation for Israeli bombardments of several Shia villages in south Lebanon.	25X1
27 December	Spain: Small bomb damages policeman's home in Bilbao suburb of Barakaldo. The Basque terrorist group Fatherland and Liberty-Military Wing claimed responsibility in a communique.	25X1
	Afghanistan: Australian detainees released. The couple, taken hostage by dissident tribesmen in Pakistan several months ago, were turned over to the Afghan Government, which held them for entering the country illegally.	25X1

	Pakistan: Large bomb found in railway station. The device exploded while bomb squad personnel were preparing to defuse it. There were no injuries or damage, and no group has claimed responsibility.	25X1
29 December	Iran: Two Yemenis tried for hijacking Saudi airliner in November 1984. One hijacker was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment while the other was acquitted. The trial was the first of its kind in Iran's judicial history.	25X1
30 December	Spain: Unidentified youths kill former civil guard member in Lasarte. No one has claimed responsibility for the murder.	25X1
	Spain: Basque businessman kidnaped outside restaurant near Bilbao. The Basque terrorist group Fatherland and Liberty-Military Wing (ETA-M) claimed responsibility. Police freed the businessman on 10 January and detained 19 suspects, including three ETA-M gunmen.	25X1
	Spain: Grenade attack damages vacant civil guard barracks in Bilbao. The Basque terrorist group Fatherland and Liberty has claimed responsibility for the incident.	25 X 1
	Guatemala: Four gunmen firing submachineguns kill chief of Judiciary Police on Guatemala City street. His wife was not injured. No group claimed responsibility.	25 X 1
	Peru: Unknown assailants attack home of former President in Lima. Four men and a woman traveling in a car fired shots at the residence of 91-year-old ex-President Jose Luis Bustamente y Rivero. There were no injuries.	25 X 1
	Zimbabwe: White farmer shot to death in Matabeleland South. The government has blamed the Zimbabwe African People's Union for the killing.	25 X 1
	India: Two persons, one of them Sikh, shot while traveling on motor scooter in Punjab. Sikh extremists are suspected.	25 X 1
1 January	Northern Ireland: Bomb attack kills two policemen on foot patrol, injures another in Belfast. The Provisional IRA claimed responsibility.	25 X 1
	Netherlands: Bulgarian travel office in Amsterdam bombed. The explosion caused no injuries and only minor property damage. Police suspect Bulgarian dissidents were responsible for the attack.	25 X 1
	Lebanon: Body of second Lebanese Jew held hostage since March discovered in Beirut. The "Organization of the Oppressed" had threatened to execute its remaining two hostages unless Israel released Muslim prisoners from Al-Khiam prison in southern Lebanon. On 2 January, General Lahd of the Army of South Lebanon ordered the release of 20 prisoners as a New Year's goodwill gesture.	25X1

	Peru: Sendero Luminoso stages New Year's Day massacre in Agua Blanca, murdering 16 Indian peasants. During the attack, villagers killed two of the guerrillas in what was reported to be the bloodiest incident of its kind since November.	25 X 1
4 January	Spain: Two anti-US groups claim bombings of three US firms in Bilbao and Oveido. The small radical group Iraultza (Revolution) claimed a bombing at Rank Xerox and an attempted bombing of the office of the 3M Company in Bilbao. In Oveido, police defused a bomb at a Ford office, which the First of October Antifascist Resistance Group claimed to have planted in a demand for Spain to withdraw from NATO.	25X1
6 January	Peru: Three dynamite sticks explode at Fisheries Ministry building in Lima. Windows were shattered, but there were no injuries. No claim of responsibility has been made for the attack.	25X1
12 January	France: Police arrest Spanish terrorists in Paris. Three suspected members of the Spanish leftist anti-US terrorist group First of October Antifascist Resistance Group were arrested following the discovery of documents and weapons in a railway luggage locker.	25 X 1
14 January	Spain: Suspected ETA-M members bomb French targets. In San Sebastian, a bomb exploded at a French automobile showroom. In Irun, a bomb exploded under a French truck, and a second device placed under another French truck was detonated by police.	25 X 1

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